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I. INTRODUCTION
Sweatshop labor is the dirty secret underlying much of the clothing that is 
manufactured and purchased in the United States.  While the onset of several scandals 
involving celebrity clothing lines drew sweatshop labor into public scrutiny a few years 
ago, few people realize that sweatshop labor is a daily fact of life within the domestic 
garment industry.
Horrific abuses were brought to light when garment workers in El Monte, 
California were discovered chained to their machines by employers who forced them to 
work in abhorrent conditions.  While few cases involve the egregious, slavery-like 
situation found in El Monte, sweatshops continue to be an ongoing problem within the 
garment industry in Los Angeles.
Developments within federal law will make it even more difficult to combat the 
existence and proliferation of sweatshops.  In a misguided effort to minimize illegal entry 
into the United States, the Supreme Court has injected immigration law into statutory 
schemes that previously protected both documented and undocumented workers from 
sweatshop conditions and employer abuse.  This recent jurisprudence, as exemplified by 
the Hoffman Plastics1 decision, also will make it more difficult for workers to form 
unions to fight egregious workplace conditions.   
In issuing these decisions, the Supreme Court has flatly disregarded 
Congressional history and statutory language indicating that employment law protections 
apply to all workers in the United States.  Moreover, the Court ironically has created 
incentives that will encourage unscrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers 
1 Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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because the employers know they can violate statutory rights of undocumented workers 
with virtual impunity.  
This paper will argue that Hoffman Plastics was wrongly decided.  Perhaps more 
importantly, however, this paper will argue that the Hoffman Plastics decision reveals a
more fundamental problem in American labor law, as embodied in the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”).  Specifically, because the Act was designed to 
compensate wronged employees but not to punish employers guilty of labor law 
violations, the Act lacks the “teeth” necessary to deter employer misconduct. 
This paper recommends that the Act be amended both to clarify the scope of its 
protections and to ensure that sufficient remedies exist to punish wrongdoers and deter 
violations. Part II provides a factual background describing the garment industry as an 
example of the employment conditions in which undocumented aliens work.  It explains 
how the garment industry relies upon the exploitation of undocumented workers and 
extensive labor code violations to ensure maximum profit for manufacturers and retailers.  
Part III provides a description of pertinent statutory schemes governing labor and 
immigration in the United States, focusing upon the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.  It also analyzes 
recent federal case law and explains how these decisions have undermined both labor and 
immigration policies.  
Part IV explains why Hoffman Plastics was wrongly decided.  It examines the 
likely impact of Hoffman Plastics on both employment conditions and illegal 
immigration.  It concludes by arguing that the NLRA must be amended to provide 
sufficient remedies in order to serve both immigration and employment policy goals.  It 
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also outlines additional steps that will better enable effective prosecution of unscrupulous 
employers.  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND – SWEATSHOPS, RAMPANT 
LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS, AND UNIONIZATION
A. Undocumented Workers in California
Illegal immigration is a fact of life in California.  Every year, thousands of
immigrants cross the border and enter the United States without permission.  As of 
January, 2000, over seven million undocumented immigrants were living in the United 
States;2 approximately forty percent live in California.3
Congress has attempted to deter illegal immigration by enacting immigration laws 
that seek to limit and deter the entry of immigrants.  Yet, because immigration is shaped 
by economic forces beyond the government’s control, such laws have been largely 
ineffective.  
One of the primary reasons behind illegal immigration is the disparity of wealth 
between the United States and countries south of its border.  Life in the immigrant’s 
country of origin may have been difficult, dangerous, or without economic opportunities.  
Grinding poverty may motivate individuals to seek employment opportunities elsewhere.  
As a result, Congress’s attempts to eliminate illegal immigration have, at best, reduced 
the volume without eliminating the flow of immigrants entering without permission.4
2 See http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Ill_Report_1211.pdf
(last visited August 20, 2003). 
3 See, e.g., http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/illegal.htm
4 See, e.g., Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286, 1439-40 (April, 1983). 
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As many unauthorized immigrants flee poverty to enter the United States, it is no 
surprise that they often hope to secure employment after entry.5 In fact, numerous 
industries that depend upon their low-wage, low-skilled labor draw them here.6 Although 
an exact determination is difficult, it is estimated that about 30.9 percent of the labor 
force in Los Angeles lacks work authorization.7
Many undocumented immigrants find jobs in Los Angeles sweatshops, toiling for 
the garment industry. In fact, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) suggests 
that immigrants comprise over 85% of Los Angeles' garment workers.8
B. Sweatshops 
The word "sweatshop" was first used in the 19th century.  The term originally 
described a system by which middlemen "sweated" profit from workers, who were paid 
minimal wages in exchange for long hours and unsanitary conditions.9
5
 Some argue that the undocumented workforce in California creates an underground 
economy, without which the California economy could not thrive.  Undocumented 
workers pick the food Californians eat, tend to gardens of California residents, bus their 
dishes and cook their food in restaurants, wash their cars, care for their children, and 
clean their houses.  Moreover, undocumented workers perform these services for very 
little money.  Opponents of illegal immigration claim that undocumented workers take 
jobs away from American citizens.  Others, however, point out that no American citizen 
would be willing to do these jobs, given the horrible conditions and low wages.  Of 
course, if a readily available, easily exploited undocumented workforce did not exist, 
perhaps employers would be forced to pay higher wages and improve working conditions 
so that American citizens would be willing to take these low-skilled jobs.  This debate, 
while interesting and important, is outside the scope of this paper.  Suffice to say that an 
undocumented workforce exists, and until the dire economic circumstances in other parts 
of the world improve, illegal immigration is likely to continue. 
6
 Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion And Membership: The Dual Identity Of The Undocumented 
Worker Under United States Law 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955, 990-92 (November, 
1988/December, 1988).
7
 NOTE: Piece by Piece: Garment Workers, Livable Wages, and Economic Development 
in Los Angeles County, 7 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y 147, 156 (Fall, 2001).
8 Id.
9
 http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org/swatch/industry/
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Today, the United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) defines a 
sweatshop as "an employer that violates more than one federal or state labor, industrial 
homework, occupational safety and health, workers' compensation, or industry 
registration law."10  Colloquially, the term sweatshop is often used to describe a 
workplace where employees earn low wages, enjoy few or no benefits, suffer from unsafe 
working conditions, and face unfair or arbitrary discipline.11
C. The Garment Industry
Most garment factories in the United States qualify as sweatshops.  According to 
the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”), more than half of the 22,000 garment
factories in the United States violate minimum wage and overtime laws, and 75% of 
these factories violate safety and health laws.12 The DOL conducted a survey in Southern 
California and found that two-thirds of the garment factories inspected qualified as 
sweatshops based upon their failure to comply with federal minimum wage and overtime 
laws.13 Many factory owners had paid workers less than half the federal minimum 
wage.14 In total, the sweatshops surveyed owed $900,000 in back wages to 1,400 
workers.15
10 Id.
11 Id.
12
 http://www.dol.gov/esa/media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm.
13 Id. Most domestic garment factories are located in Los Angeles, the city on which this 
paper will focus.  See Piece by Piece, supra note 7 at 149.  Domestic sweatshops, 
however, are not limited to California.  In fact, sweatshops exist wherever the desperation 
of a large undocumented immigrant community encourages the payment of sub-standard 
wages.  See Leo L. Lam, Designer Duty: Extending Liability To Manufacturers For 
Violations Of Labor Standards In Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 623, 
633-34 (December, 1992).
14 http://www.dol.gov/esa/media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm
15 Id. To conduct the study, the DOL investigated 67 garment shops that were randomly 
chosen from a list of factories registered with the California Labor Commissioner. The 
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Of course, workers face additional injustices in these factories that are not 
reflected in the dollar amounts owed.  For example, many sweatshop workers risk their 
lives as they toil between 60 and 80 hours per week in factories with blocked fire exits,
poor lighting, and inadequate ventilation.16 Working conditions are often unsanitary, and 
factories are crowded, hot, cramped, and filled with flammable materials and hazardous 
wiring.17 Furthermore, workers are denied dignity as they endure constant surveillance 
and arbitrary discipline.18 In order to maintain a submissive workforce, management will 
verbally or physically abuse their employees and threaten to terminate workers or report 
them to the INS if they complain.19
A shocking example of sweatshop exploitation was discovered in August 1995, 
when over 70 immigrant garment workers were found working behind barbed wire and 
under armed guard in El Monte, California.20  The garment workers had toiled up to 
nineteen hours a day, seven days per week, for little or no pay.21  Workers had been held 
against their will for up to seventeen years.22  As they were forced to sew clothes for 
survey does not include inspections unregistered shops, in which even more egregious 
violations likely occur.  Id.
16 www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org – the garment industry
17Lam, supra note 13 at 633-34; Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: 
Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 291, 297 
(Winter, 2003).
18 Id.
19 www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org – the garment industry; Lora Jo Foo, 
The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening 
Worker Protective Legislation., 103 Yale L.J. 2179, 2182-86 (May 1994) . 
20
 First Amended Complaint, Bureerong v. Uvawas, No. 95-5958 (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 
25, 1995) (Collins, J.)(“Bureerong Complaint”).  Patrick Lee & George White, INS Got 
Tip on Sweatshop 3 Years Ago, L.A. Times, Aug. 4. 1995 at A1.
21 Bureerong Complaint supra note 20.
22 Id.
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famous retailers and manufacturers,23 they slaved in over-crowded, unsafe conditions.  
Rats crawled over them as they ate, slept, worked, and lived in the factory, which was 
surrounded by razor wire.24 They were required to purchase food and other daily 
necessities from their employers, who charged them four to five times the market price.25
Because the workers could not make unmonitored phone calls or write uncensored 
letters,26 no one outside the factory knew of their misery until one of the workers escaped 
through an air duct.27
The El Monte case presents an extreme example of the horrors of sweatshop 
abuse.  A less egregious, perhaps more common example of a Los Angeles sweatshop is 
described in a 2001 suit filed against the Apex factory, which manufactured clothing for 
Bebe, Inc.28  Immigrant workers filed claims against Apex and Bebe for unpaid minimum 
wage and overtime pay.29  The workers typically worked 10-12 hours a day, six days a 
week.  The manager of the factory admitted under oath that he routinely altered the piece 
23
 The clothes were sold by some of the biggest retail stores in America, including 
Mervyn's, Miller's Outpost, Montgomery Ward, May Co., Nordstrom, Sears, and Target.  
Notes from interviews with attorneys representing workers, on file with author.  The law 
firm for which I worked represented the workers as co-counsel with the Asian Pacific 
American Legal Center.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26
 After the August raid, eight operators of the sweatshop were arrested and charged with 
involuntary servitude, kidnapping, conspiracy, smuggling, and harboring of the workers. 
In February 1996, they pled guilty to criminal charges of involuntary servitude and 
conspiracy. Ultimately, the workers were victorious in their civil suit, and they received a 
sizeable settlement worth several million dollars.
27 Patrick Lee & George White, INS Got Tip on Sweatshop 3 Years Ago , L.A. Times, 
Aug. 4. 1995 at A1.
28 First Amended Complaint, Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., et al., No. CV 01-10950 (C.D. 
Cal.) (Fees, J.)(hereinafter “Bebe Complaint”).
29 Id.
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sheets and time cards of the workers.30  These alterations resulted in the workers 
receiving no overtime pay.31  In addition, the factory managers routinely harassed and 
berated the workers.32  When some of the workers stood up to the managers, they were 
terminated and blackballed from seeking further employment in the garment industry.33
It is no coincidence that many of the workers willing to toil under these horrible 
conditions are immigrants who lack work authorization. In a 1988 GAO report, which 
characterized the garment industry as a "sweatshop industry,” the government attributed 
the proliferation of sweatshops, in part, to the utilization of a vulnerable and easily-
exploited immigrant workforce.34 Because undocumented immigrants with limited skills 
and language barriers find few appealing options, their desperation forces them to accept 
low-paying, grueling, entry level jobs that documented workers would shun.  
At the same time, factory operators often prefer to hire undocumented immigrants
because their vulnerability necessitates a tolerance for abuse that documented workers 
would be unwilling to withstand.35 This abuse continues without repercussion in part 
because many unauthorized garment workers decline to file claims against their 
employers for fear of deportation.36  Employers exploit this fear, knowing that few if any 
30
 Deposition transcript of Edmund Chan, on file with the author.
31 Id.
32 Bebe Complaint, supra note 28.
33 Id..
34 Foo, supra note 19 at 2186. The GAO also indicated that lack of adequate enforcement 
of labor laws and inadequate penalties for violations also enabled to perpetuation of 
sweatshops.  Id.  These factors will be addressed later in this paper.
35 Id.
36
 Their fear is certainly warranted.  Upon their discovery, the El Monte workers were 
hardly treated with compassion.  Rather, they were rounded up and placed in federal 
penitentiaries.  Only exhaustive efforts from public interest attorneys and tremendous 
public outcry prevented their deportation.  Notes from interviews with attorneys, on file 
with author.
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workers would report labor code violations.  As a result, employers can lower wages, 
extend work hours, disregard health and safety regulations, and suppress unionizing 
efforts with near impunity.   
D. How the Garment Industry Encourages the Existence of 
Sweatshops
The structure of the garment industry encourages the creation and proliferation of 
sweatshops. The industry is commonly described as a pyramid, with each level formed 
by a different step of garment production.  A retailer exists at the top of the pyramid.  
Manufacturers, which design, sell, and supply clothes under their own labels to retailers
occupy the tier immediately below.  
Subcontractor factories occupy the next step of the pyramid.  Most manufacturers 
outsource actual production to such factories, where the garments are sewn, trimmed, and 
pressed.37 The factories are often small and may not be tied to specific sites or facilities.  
They may relocate often, sometimes re-opening in a new factory under a different name.
Manufacturers contract production to factories in order to shift various costs and 
business risks to the factories and thereby maximize profits.38  For example, by 
outsourcing production, manufacturers can decrease overhead because they do not need 
to secure or maintain a factory or sewing machines.  Further, they reduce labor costs 
because they are not required to hire or fire seamstresses, based upon their particular 
needs at any given moment.39   And, they can attempt to shield themselves from liability 
37
 Lung, supra note 17 at 300.
38 Id. at 300-01.
39 Piece by piece, supra note 7 at  n.40
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for labor code violations by claiming that they do not employ the garment workers who 
sew and finish their products.40
Factory managers hire and supervise the garment workers that sew and assemble 
the garments according to the manufacturer’s specifications and timetable.41 Garment 
workers are at the bottom of the pyramid:  they are the most numerous, the least paid, and 
the most badly treated.  Their tasks are repetitive and physically exhausting, yet require 
no job training or education.  For these reasons, workers are considered fungible and may 
be hired or fired based upon the vagaries of the industry.
  Most garment workers are paid according to the piecework system.  Rather than 
an hourly wage, a pieceworker is paid for each garment he or she sews.  As a result, 
wages vary depending upon how fast a seamstress works.  Subcontractors often require 
seamstresses to complete work at home in order to avoid paying overtime wages required 
by law.42
Needless to say, profits are not distributed equally throughout the pyramid.  The 
top layers of the pyramid enjoy the lion’s share of the profits, with profit share decreasing 
each step down the pyramid.  For example, a retailer typically enjoys a 100 percent 
markup on each garment. Accordingly, for a garment that costs the consumer $100, the 
retailer will earn $50, the manufacturer will earn $30, the contractor will earn $15, and 
40
 Developments in the joint employer doctrine, explained below, may eventually curtail 
their ability to shield themselves from liability for labor code violations.  
41 Lung, supra note 17. at 300.
42 Id.
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the remaining $5 will be divided among all factory workers who sewed, assembled, 
finished, and pressed the garment.43
In Los Angeles, over 4000 subcontractors vie for contracts. 44 This creates 
excessive competition between factories, which when combined with consolidation at the 
top of the pyramid, grants manufacturers the buying power to dictate the terms of their 
orders to factories.45 If a factory cannot complete an order at the manufacturer’s price, the 
manufacturer will simply take the order to another factory that can meet its demands.46
Driven by such conditions, factories underbid their competitors and are willing to accept 
whatever price the manufacturer dictates in order to secure contracts. If factories cannot 
compete, they go out of business, and the manufacturer simply hires new factories to 
replace them.47 To stay in business at the prices dictated by manufacturers, factory 
managers must force employees to work longer hours at lower wages, denying them the 
minimum wages and overtime payments required by law.48
Factory managers undoubtedly take comfort from the fact that they are unlikely to 
be prosecuted for even flagrant violations of the law. Government inspections are 
infrequent.  For example, in California, there is only a twenty or twenty-five percent 
chance that any garment shop will be subjected to random inspection.49
Private lawsuits are even less common.  Many workers fear termination, 
deportation, or unemployment and are thus hesitant to report workplace violations.  The 
43Piece by piece, supra note 7 at 160.
44
 Foo, supra note 179 at 2186. 
45
 Lung, supra note 17 at 300-01.
46 www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org
47
 Foo, supra note 19 at 2187; Lam, supra note 13. 
48 Id.
49 Id.
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few who are prosecuted may avoid paying fines by filing bankruptcy or temporarily 
going out of business, only to reopen under new names and continue to abuse workers.50
Under these circumstances, some factories accept the resulting small risk of prosecution
as an acceptable cost of doing business.  
E. The Unfulfilled Promise of Unionization
For over one hundred years, unions have attempted to organize garment workers 
in hope of improving their working conditions and wages.  For example, in the early 
1900s, the ILGWU, the leading union representing workers producing women's clothing, 
organized a four-month strike to pressure the Triangle Shirt Company to increase wages 
and decrease hours.  The ILGWU was able to negotiate a compromise with over three 
hundred manufacturers, thereby securing the power and influence of the union.51  Later, 
the ILGWU, with assistance from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America 
("ACWA"), unionized over two-thirds of the garment industry and negotiated a forty-four 
hour workweek and a fixed salary for workers.52
More recently, in 1976, the ACWA merged with the Textile Workers Union of 
America to form the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("ACTWU").
The ACTWU merged with the ILGWU in 1995 to form the Union of Needletrades, 
50In fact, the average life span of a garment factory is only thirteen months. Id.
51
 Holly R. Winefsky and Julie A. Tenney, Preserving The Garment Industry Proviso: 
Protecting Acceptable Working Conditions Within The Apparel And Accessories 
Industries, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 587, 604 (Winter, 2000).
52 Id. at 604-05
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Industrial and Textile Employees ("UNITE").53 UNITE currently represents over 250,000 
garment workers in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. 54
Despite such progress, most garment factories are non-union.55 In particular, 
unions and advocacy groups that have tried to organize garment workers in Los Angeles 
have met with limited success. As of 1998, less than ten percent of Los Angeles garment 
workers were members of UNITE.56
Unionization is difficult in Los Angeles because factories frequently change 
locations and remain dispersed throughout a large geographical area.57 In addition, the 
large percentage of undocumented workers in Los Angeles complicates unionization.  
Many such workers believe that the risks of attempting unionize outweigh the benefits or 
likelihood of success.58  They may feel desperate to keep their jobs and reject any action 
taken against their employer’s interests because it would increase the likelihood of their
termination.59 Due to their undocumented status, they may also fear deportation.60
Although unions once viewed immigrants to threaten job security for American 
workers, organized labor has changed its view and treatment of undocumented workers.   
53 Id.; Laura Ho, Catherine Powell, and Leti Volpp, (Dis)Assembling Rights Of Women 
Workers Along The Global Assembly Line: Human Rights And The Garment Industry, 31 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 383 (Summer, 1996).
54
 Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51; Ho, Powell, and Volpp, supra note 53.
55
 Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51 at 637.
56 Piece by piece, supra note 7 at 166. 
57 Id.
58
 Bosniak, supra note 6 at 993-97.
59
 Winefsky and Tenney, supra note 51 at 637-40.
60 Id.
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Most unions now advocate unity among workers, regardless of immigration status.61
Some unions have even prioritized the recruitment of undocumented workers and have 
hired immigrant and bilingual organizers, printed materials in the workers’ native 
languages, and sponsored classes on citizenship and immigrants' rights.62
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Undocumented workers occupy a unique position at the juncture of immigration 
law and labor law.  As explained by Professor Linda Bosniak, on the one hand, they are 
not legally authorized to be present and working in the United States.  On the other hand, 
they are protected by American labor laws and have the same rights as other workers to 
bargain collectively, earn minimum wage and overtime pay, and enjoy safe working 
conditions.63
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this tension in a way that prioritizes
immigration concerns over labor law issues.  Although the Court maintains that 
undocumented workers are employees with specific rights, they have denied them the 
remedies that make such rights meaningful.  In so doing, they paint undocumented 
workers with the brush of illegality, nullifying legal protections due to the workers’ own 
prior illegal conduct in crossing the border and working without permission.  Yet in 
61 Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 345, 399 (Summer, 
2001).
62 Bosniak, supra note 6 at 995.   Some unions have even taken special steps to protect 
workers from deportation.  For example, some unions have introduced "INS clauses," 
into collective bargaining agreements that require employers to notify the union if the 
INS arrives at a factory so that the union can protect its members.  Some contracts require 
employers, "to the extent permitted by law," to deny INS agents access to the factory or 
to worker employment records.  Some contracts even require employers to reinstate 
employees who miss work to attend an INS proceeding and authorize unions to provide 
legal assistance in advance of an INS raid. Id.
63 Id.
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denying remedies and eviscerating statutory protections for undocumented workers, the 
court has undermined employment conditions for all workers. 
The next section provides a brief description of select immigration and labor laws. 
A. Relevant Statutory Schemes
1. Employment Law
a.  The NLRA
Congress created the NLRA64 in 1935 to curb unfair labor practices, protect 
workers’ rights of association, and support organized unionization and the collective 
bargaining process.65 The NLRA applies to “any employee” in the United States.66  It is
well-settled that under this broad statutory definition, undocumented workers are 
protected by the NLRA.67
The NLRA authorized the creation of the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “Board”) to enforce orders against practices that violated the NLRA.  While 
the NLRB may exercise broad discretion in creating and enforcing remedies, it is 
64
 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
65
 29 U.S.C. § 157; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-85 (1941).
66
 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  The full definition is as follows: “The term ''employee'' shall 
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, 
unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose 
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or 
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and 
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an 
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any 
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an 
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual 
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), as 
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein 
defined.” 
67
 See, e.g., Sure-Tan at 891-92.
Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops
17
specifically authorized to require reinstatement with backpay and to issue cease and 
desist orders.  Each of these remedies will be briefly addressed in turn below.
Reinstatement occurs when a striking or terminated employee is allowed to return 
to work.  Reinstatement is not an absolute right.  Rather, the NLRB has the authority to 
assess, on a case by case basis, whether reinstatement is appropriate.  Generally, 
reinstatement is not appropriate when termination or refusal to hire was “for cause.”  
Along these lines, the NLRB may deny reinstatement to an employee who engaged in 
illegal activity prior to or in connection with his or her unlawful termination.68 For 
example, the Board may decline to award reinstatement to an employee who illegally 
entered or gained employment in the United States.  The NLRB may require that an 
employee prove that he or she is legally entitled to work in the United States prior to 
reinstatement.69
An award of backpay often accompanies reinstatement.70 Backpay represents 
wages for hours not worked due to an illegal termination.  Calculation of backpay is 
generally based on the wages that the employee would have earned from the time of the 
illegal termination until either reinstatement or the securing of alternate employment.71
The NLRB may also issue a “cease and desist” order, which requires an employer to stop 
unlawful conduct or face contempt charges.  
68
 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
69 A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil , 134 F.3d at 57.
70 See, e.g, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
71 APRA Fuel Oil, 134 F.3d at 57.
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b. The FLSA
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)72 in 1938 to eliminate 
“labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”73  The FLSA 
dictates minimum wages, minimum age for employment, health and safety standards, and 
overtime requirements.74 The FLSA applies to all employees, including undocumented 
workers.75
Employees may file claims against employers who violate provisions of the FLSA 
to recover unpaid wages, backpay, liquidated damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s 
fees and costs.76  Employers who violate the FLSA may also face criminal penalties.77
In addition to protecting employees, the FLSA aims to protect law-abiding, 
reputable employers who, prior to the FLSA, operated at a competitive disadvantage with 
sweatshops.  In fact, the FLSA defines substandard labor conditions to constitute "an 
unfair method of competition in commerce."78
B. Immigration Law
It is well-established that the United States has the authority to forbid aliens from 
crossing its borders.  Although no constitutional provision expressly grants Congress the 
power to exclude aliens from the United States, federal courts have recognized the 
72
 29 USC §§ 201-219.
73Id. at § 202(a).
74 Id. at §§ 201-19.
75 See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir, 1988); Contreras, 25 
F. Supp 2d at 1059-60.
76
 See §§ 126(a), (b)
77 Id. at § 216(a).
78 See Bosniak, supra note 6 at 1003-04.
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implicit existence of such authority as part of Congress’s plenary power to control its
borders.79
For over one hundred years, Congress has limited immigration into the United 
States by authorizing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to deny aliens 
permission to enter into the United States and to deport those who have entered the 
country without permission.80 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)81 addresses 
the terms and conditions of admission into the United States.82  The INA prohibits
unauthorized entry and penalizes aliens who enter the United States without permission.83
Initially, the INA did not address employment or include any provisions 
governing the legality or treatment of undocumented workers. This approach shifted
when certain members of Congress decided that the best way to deter illegal entry was to 
eliminate the ability of unauthorized immigrants to seek employment  after crossing the 
border.  They believed that sanctioning employers who hired undocumented aliens would 
reduce the number of jobs available to them, thereby eliminating the incentive for illegal 
entry.84
Thus, in an effort to further curtail the illegal entry and subsequent employment of 
unauthorized aliens, in 1986 Congress passed sweeping legislation known as the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), which was incorporated as amendments 
79
 Bosniak, supra note 6 at 967-68.
80
 8 USC §§ 1225-27 (1994).  This power is now exercised by the Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services. 
81
 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
82 See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
83
 Bosniak, supra note 6 at 987
84
 Bosniak, supra note 6 at 956-57.
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into the INA.85 Although the IRCA allowed undocumented immigrants who had resided 
continuously in the country since 1982 to normalize their status through an amnesty 
program,86 a comprehensive scheme of employer sanctions comprises the bulk of the 
IRCA.  
For the first time in American history, Congress attempted to deter the 
employment of undocumented workers by punishing those who hire them.87  The IRCA 
requires employers to seek verification of immigration or naturalization status prior to 
hiring employees.  It also requires employers to keep records of workers' immigration 
status, and it imposes fines on employers who knowingly hire or recruit undocumented 
workers.88  An employer who demonstrates a pattern and practice of hiring 
undocumented workers can be sentenced to a six-month prison term.  The law also 
creates criminal penalties for immigrants who work without authorization, and it requires 
employers to terminate employees upon learning of their undocumented status. 89
In making it illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers, Congress linked
immigration law to the workplace and authorized – in fact, required -- employers to 
police the workplace for unauthorized aliens.  Despite such provisions, Congress did not
amend labor laws to diminish their scope or exclude undocumented workers from their 
protections. 90  In fact, even a cursory consideration of Congressional history reveals the 
opposite:  Congress did not intend for the IRCA to limit employment laws or remedies in 
85 Id. at 1008. 
86
 The inclusion of legalization provisions represented a political compromise after 
several years of heated debate. Id. at 1009.  
87
  8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
88 Id.
89
 Undocumented workers that attempt to use fraudulent documents in the employment 
verification system are subject to fines of up to $3000 and criminal prosecution.
90
 134 F.3d at 55-56
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any way.  Instead, Congress remained determined to preserve protections and remedies 
for all workers , regardless of status, to ensure that no incentive existed to prefer 
undocumented workers.91 This dual purpose highlights the tension between the 
Congressional goal of supporting broad labor rights with the perceived need to restrict 
immigration.92
For a variety of reasons, the IRCA has not succeeded in deterring the employment 
of undocumented workers.93 Professor Linda Bosniak has presented a compelling 
argument showing that at its core, the IRCA was ill-conceived and represents a grave 
misunderstanding and underestimation of the circumstances which drive immigrants to 
seek illegal employment in the first place.  As noted by Professor Bosniak, among others,
the IRCA fails to account for the social, economic and political conditions that ensure a 
constant flow of undocumented workers into this country.94
Moreover, in addition to failing to deter illegal immigration, the IRCA does not 
sufficiently deter employer misconduct because the standard for liability is too high.  As 
a result, wrongdoers are rarely held accountable.  Employers are only sanctioned if they 
knew their employee lacked authorization.  Good faith compliance with the verification 
process supplies an affirmative defense that eviscerates any liability.  An employer must 
only show the documents supplied by a prospective employee were “reasonable on their 
face” in order to avoid liability.95 Employers know that they can hire workers presenting 
91Id.
92Nessel, supra note 61.
93 The IRCA has created a thriving market, however, for the manufacture and sale of 
fraudulent documents to those who have entered without permission. Foo, supra note 19
at 2183. 
94 See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 6 at 1018; Nessel, supra note 61 at 357. 
95
 Bosniak, supra note 6 at n.246.
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fraudulent documentation and avoid sanctions by claiming that they held a good faith 
belief in the documents’ authenticity. 96
Sanctions are imposed far too infrequently to deter violations. The funding for 
federal agencies responsible for enforcing the IRCA97 has been inadequate and poorly 
allocated.98 Employers know that enforcement of the IRCA is sporadic at best, and the 
prospect of any penalty must be discounted by the likelihood of actually being caught and 
prosecuted. 
For these reasons, statutory penalties are simply insufficient when compared with 
the benefits of hiring undocumented workers.  Some employers prefer to hire 
undocumented workers because their rights need not be respected.  Undocumented 
workers are increasingly vulnerable as they are subject to criminal penalties and 
deportation.  As a result, the need to remain under the radar deters undocumented 
workers from complaining about their working conditions or demanding that employers 
respect their rights.  Moreover, reliance on undocumented workers, who can be easily 
exploited, gives unscrupulous employers a competitive advantage.  For these reasons, 
unscrupulous employers are often willing to pay fines as part of the costs of doing 
business. 99
Ironically, by criminalizing the employment of unauthorized immigrants, the 
IRCA has made their employment more desirable.  As a result, wage levels and working 
96
 Foo, supra note 19. 
97Initially, these agencies were the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the 
Department of Labor (DOL). Recently, the INS was supplanted by the Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection.  
98 See Bosniak, supra note 6 at 1013. 
99 Id.
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conditions within the garment industry have diminshed as workers become more 
vulnerable to employer abuse.100
The next section will explain how recent case law nullifies statutory labor rights 
for undocumented workers by depriving them of remedies for legal violations.
C. Pertinent Case law
Recent decisions have injected the IRCA into labor law adjudication. In 
recognizing that undocumented workers are “employees” under labor law statutes, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that labor laws were intended to protect undocumented 
workers.  Yet in denying remedies to undocumented workers, the Court has nullified any 
protection Congress offered them. These decisions ultimately will undermine labor 
conditions for all workers, regardless of their immigration status.  
The next section will assess recent federal cases, starting with the 1984 Supreme 
Court decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,101 to reveal how the Court’s decision to 
prioritize immigration law over labor law undermines the policy goals of the IRCA, the 
NLRA, and the FLSA.  
1. Sure-Tan
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB¸ thus beginning the 
Court’s pattern of curtailing employment rights in an attempt to serve immigration 
goals.102 Sure-Tan had violated the NLRA by asking the INS to investigate workers’ 
100 David Bacon, The Political Economy Of Undocumented Immigration In The U.S., 
available at www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/industry/.org.
101
 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
102Id.
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immigration statuses after they had voted in favor unionization.103 Upon discovering that 
the employees had entered the United States illegally, the INS apprehended them and 
immediately placed them on a bus bound for Mexico.104
The union filed a claim with the NLRB, indicating that Sure -Tan had violated the 
NLRA by reporting the employees to the INS solely because they supported 
unionization.105   The NLRB resolved the claim in favor of the union and issued an order
requiring reinstatement.  It also ordered Sure-Tan to cease and desist violating the 
NLRA.106 The Board deferred determination of backpay for a subsequent compliance 
hearing.107
Sure-Tan appealed the order to the Seventh Circuit, which modified the NLRB 
order.108  Noting that the former employees were already in Mexico, the Seventh Circuit
required reinstatement “only if the discriminatees [were] legally present and legally free 
to be employed in this country when they offer[ed] themselves for reinstatement.”109  The 
court further stated that because backpay awards traditionally were tolled for any period 
during which the employee was unavailable for work, the employees would be denied 
backpay for any period during which they were not lawfully present and entitled to work 
in the United States.110 Noting that tolling could eviscerate any backpay award or 
103 Id. at 887.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 887-88.
106 Id. at 888-89.
107
 246 N.L.R.B. 788 (1979).
108
 NLRB v. Sure-Tan, 672 F.2d 592, 603-06 (7th Cir. 1982).
109 Id. at 606.
110 Id., citing, NLRB v. Hickory’s Best, Inc., 267 NLRB 1274, 1277 (1983)(employees are 
unavailable for work and therefore not entitled to backpay when they are out of the 
country.)
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remedy, however, the court adopted a conjectural, six-month period, based upon which it 
awarded backpay.111
On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that undocumented workers qualify
as employees and were therefore protected by the NLRA.112 It also recognized that 
extending NLRA coverage to undocumented workers was consistent with the Act’s goal 
of protecting the collective-bargaining process.113 The Court reasoned that because the 
INA evidenced only a peripheral concern with the employment of undocumented 
workers, applying the NLRA to undocumented workers would not conflict with the 
INA.114 In complete contrast to its later analysis in Hoffman Plastics, the Court 
acknowledged that applying the NLRA to undocumented workers would serve 
immigration policy by diminish ing any incentive to hire them, thereby reducing the pull 
for aliens to enter the country illegally in search of employment.115
Nonetheless, while the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the receipt of 
backpay and reinstatement must be conditioned upon the immigrants’ lawful re-entry, it 
flatly rejected the adoption of a conjectural six-month period because it was not narrowly 
tailored to the “actual, compensable injury suffered by the discharged employees.”116
The Court acknowledged that its ruling could nullify the remedies available under the 
NLRA, but it stated that a solution must be sought in Congress rather than in the 
courts.117 In sum, the Court in Sure-Tan recognized important immigration and labor 
111 Id.
112
 467 U.S. at 891-92.
113 Id. at 892.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 894.
116
 467 U.S. at 900-01.
117 Id. at 903-05.
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policy reasons for protecting undocumented workers under the NLRA. At the same time, 
it declined to award backpay or reinstatement to workers who had been deported because 
doing so would have encouraged illegal re-entry into the United States.
Notably, the IRCA did not exist at the time the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan.  
Instead, the Court interpreted the INA, a statutory scheme that addressed the terms and 
conditions under which immigrants could enter the United States, but that did not 
separately address whether or not immigrants without documents could seek 
employment.118 Subsequent decisions by the lower courts reveal that Sure-Tan did not 
provide much clarity regarding what remedies were available to undocumented workers, 
particularly after the passage of the IRCA.  
2. Post Sure-Tan Confusion
a. Pre-IRCA:  Felbro
Two years after Sure-Tan and several years before the passage of the IRCA, the 
Ninth Circuit decided Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB 
(Felbro).119  The circuit court interpreted Sure-Tan’s denial of remedies to turn on 
whether the worker had already left the country, thereby requiring illegal re-entry to 
receive backpay.  It held that because the employee in the case before them had not yet 
left the United States, he was entitled to receive backpay, despite his undocumented 
status.  The court emphasized that a denial of backpay for employees who had not 
departed the country was inconsistent with the NLRA.  It further noted that nothing in 
118 Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
119 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Sure-Tan indicated that the Court was overruling a well-established line of precedent 
disregarding an employee’s legal status in awarding backpay.120
b. Post - IRCA Divergence
Despite intervening passage of the IRCA, in 1997, the Second Circuit adopted a 
similar approach in NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.121  An employer 
knowingly hired undocumented workers, but it terminated them in violation of the NLRA 
after they signed union authorization cards.122  The NLRB awarded backpay and ordered 
the employer to reinstate the employees, provided the employees could demonstrate legal 
authorization to work.123
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the Board’s order, emphasizing that the 
most effective way to further the immigration policies of the IRCA was to provide the 
protections and remedies of the NLRA to both documented and undocumented 
workers.124  Otherwise, the court noted, unscrupulous employers would have an incentive 
to “play the provisions of the NLRA and IRCA against each other to defeat the 
fundamental objectives of each, while profiting from their own wrongdoing with relative 
impunity.”125  The court distinguished Sure-Tan by noting that the employees at issue had
not left the country prior to the award.126
120 Id. at 717, 722.  Cases decided after passage of the IRCA continued to award backpay 
to undocumented workers who had not left the country after illegal termination.  See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1999).
121
 134 F.3d 50 (2d Cir., 1997).
122 Id. at 52.
123 Id. at 53.
124 Id at 55-57, 59.
125 Id. at 56-57.
126 Id. at 55.
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In Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., v. NLRB,127 however, the Seventh Circuit adopted a 
completely different approach, interpreting Sure-Tan to preclude backpay for any period 
during which an employee lacked work authorization.  Del Rey Tortilleria had terminated 
two employees for exercising their union rights.  The union filed a claim with the NLRB, 
and the Board awarded backpay and ordered reinstatement. 128
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee who lacked work 
authorization was unavailable for work and therefore not entitled to backpay.129  It further 
stated that an undocumented worker could not be cognizably harmed by termination 
unless the employee was legally entitled to work in the United States.130
3. Hoffman Plastics
In Hoffman Plastics, the Supreme Court clarified that undocumented workers 
were not entitled to backpay after being terminated in violation of the NLRA.  In so 
doing, the Court adopted a line of reasoning that directly conflicte d with the articulated 
policy reasons underlying its decision in Sure-Tan.  
Hoffman Plastics hired Jose Castro to work at its factory after reviewing
fraudulent documents indicating that Castro was lawfully entitled to work in the United 
States.131 It terminated Castro several months later because of his involvement in a union 
organizing campaign.132 Castro filed a claim against Hoffman Plastics with the NLRB .  
127
 976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992).
128 Id. at 1117.
129 Id. at 1120.
130 Id. at 1119.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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Unaware that Castro lacked work authorization, the NLRB ordered Hoffman Plastics to 
reinstate Castro and award him backpay.133
At a subsequent compliance hearing before an administrative judge, Castro 
admitted that he had supplied a friend’s birth certificate in order to secure employment
and that he was not authorized to be present or to work in the United States.134 Based on 
these admissions, the ALJ denied Castro reinstatement and backpay.135
On appeal, the NLRB reversed the ALJ’s decision and awarded Castro backpay
from the time of illegal termination until the time when Hoffman Plastics learned of his 
undocumented status.136 The NLRB emphasized that the most effective way to further 
the immigration policies embodied in the IRCA was not to differentiate between 
documented and undocumented workers in providing remedies for NLRA violations.137
Hoffman Plastics filed a petition for review with the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Circuit of Columbia, but both the original panel and a subsequent en banc
panel rejected Hoffman Plastic’s argument that undocumented workers were prohibited 
from receiving backpay, regardless of whether they had left the country after 
termination.138
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  In a 5-4 decision, Judge Rehnquist 
authored an Opinion reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision and holding that the IRCA 
precluded awarding backpay to an undocumented alien.  In finding that undocumented 
workers could not recover backpay, regardless of whether they had left the country, the 
133 Id. at 140-41.
134 Id. at 141.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id; 237 F.2d 639 (2001).
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Supreme Court extended the holding of Sure-Tan and effectively overruled less 
expansive interpretations of the IRCA as exemplified by the Felbro and A.P.R.A.
decisions. 
The Court noted that when it decided Sure-Tan, immigration law had expressed 
only a “peripheral concern” with the employment of undocumented workers and did not 
criminalize employment after illegal entry.139 The IRCA altered the statutory landscape
by explicitly prohibiting the employment of undocumented workers, requiring employers 
to discharge workers upon discovery of their undocumented status, and enacting criminal 
penalties for those who relied upon fraudulent documents to gain employment.140
The Court noted that it had consistently set aside attempts to award reinstatement 
or backpay to employees “found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their 
employment.”141 The Court stated that allowing the NLRB to award backpay to illegal 
aliens would trivialize immigration violations and undermine federal immigration policy.  
Further, any mitigation of damages would require Castro to further violate the IRCA by 
seeking illegal employment.142  Therefore, the Court concluded that the NLRB lacked the 
authority to award the remedy of backpay.143  The Court added that the NLRB was not 
without remedies, as it could still issue a cease and desist order under which Hoffman 
Plastics could be cited for contempt for failure to comply.144
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.  He countered that that all relevant federal agencies, 
139 Id. at 144-45
140 Id. at 146-48.
141
 535 U.S. at 142-43.
142 Id. at 150-51.
143 Id. at 149-50.
144 Id. at 152.
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including the Department of Justice, had indicated that award ing backpay to an 
undocumented worker would not undermine immigration policy.  Justice Breyer 
emphasized that the Court’s opinion would allow unscrupulous employers to violate the 
NLRA at least once with impunity.145 Moreover, Justice Breyer noted that the Court’s 
ruling would do little to deter illegal immigration, and that perversely, it could encourage 
employers to hire undocumented workers.146
IV. WHY HOFFMAN PLASTICS IS WRONG, WHAT IT WILL 
CHANGE, HOW IT CAN BE FIXED
A. Why Hoffman Plastics Was Wrongly-Decided
Regardless of how one feels about the unauthorized entry of aliens, the decision in 
Hoffman Plastics is problematic because it is likely to undermine the policies it professes 
to support.  As explained at length below, Hoffman Plastics will encourage unscrupulous 
employers to hire undocumented workers, thereby creating more opportunities and 
encouraging further illegal immigration.  
This perverse result would perhaps be less troubling if the opinion in Hoffman 
Plastics was dictated by relevant statutes, congressional history, or Supreme Court
precedent.  Yet, the outcome in Hoffman Plastics was not pre-ordained, and the reasoning 
utilized by the majority is by no means self-evident.  Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, hardly the 
most liberal court in the nation, came to exactly the opposite holding.
The Court’s decision is somewhat logical, if overly technical and divorced from 
contextual realities.  If an employee is not authorized to work in the United States, he or 
145 Id. at 153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 155-56.
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she technically cannot be considered available for work.  If he or she technically is not 
available for work, then he or she cannot receive backpay.  
Nonetheless, in applying the above reasoning, the Court unnecessarily injected the 
goals of immigration law into a statutory scheme designed to remedy labor code 
violations.  Although the Court emphasized that the NLRB could not enforce the NLRA 
to the IRCA’s detriment, it authorized the converse.  The NLRB is now required by the 
Court to enforce immigration law – which it clearly is not qualified or statutorily 
authorized to do.  
This decision to favor the IRCA over the NLRA was not supported by general 
principles of statutory construction or interpretation.  The Court essentially inferred a 
decision by Congress to amend the NLRA to preclude the award of remedies to 
undocumented workers.  Although a tension in federal policies exists insofar as Congress 
seeks to both protect worker rights and deter the employment of undocumented workers, 
nothing in the IRCA implicitly or explicitly amended or repealed the NLRA or any other 
labor law.147  Under basic principles of statutory interpretation, amendments by 
implication are disfavored.  Only when Congressional intent is clear should a later act 
amend or repeal provisions of an earlier act.148
Moreover, Congressional history reveals that in passing the IRCA and making the 
employment of undocumented workers illegal, Congress specifically intended not to limit 
the NLRA.  Instead, Congress emphasized that the continued protection of undocumented 
workers under the NLRA was fully consistent with the goals of the IRCA.  It also 
recognized that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents would be 
147 Id. at 646.
148
 846 F.2d at 704.
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adversely affected if undocumented workers provided job competition but were not 
subject to the same terms of employment.149
Furthermore, the House Judiciary Committee Report provided:
[N[o provision of the IRCA should be used to undermine or diminish in any way 
labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor 
relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair 
practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights 
before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by existing law.  In 
particular, the employer sanctions provisions are not intended to limit in any way the 
scope for the term “employee” in Section2(3) of the NLRA, as amended, or the rights 
and protections [therein].150
And, the House Education and Labor Committee Report had stated that no provision 
of the IRCA should limit the powers of state or federal labor standards agencies, such as 
the NLRB, to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented workers, because 
to do so would undermine efforts to limit the hiring of undocumented employees.151
Based upon the above, the NLRB’s decision to award backpay reconciled the 
goals of employment and immigration law in a way that complied with Congressional 
intent and statutory language.  Because its reconciliation of competing statutory schemes 
was reasonable, the NLRB’s decision to award backpay was entitled to deference and 
should have been affirmed.152
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See, e,g., NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994)(reasonable 
interpretations of other statutes by agency are entitled to deference).
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B. What Hoffman Plastics Will -- and Will Not -- Change
1. The One Free Pass Problem
Just like the IRCA that it aims to support, Hoffman Plastics is unlikely to deter or 
even affect illegal immigration.153  Individuals fleeing desperate economic conditions in 
their countries of origin are not likely to factor American employment laws into their 
decision to migrate.  Nor are they are likely to ponder the consequences of illegal 
termination should they attempt to unionize prior to seeking employment.
Along these lines, labor laws do not create incentives – rather, it is the jobs 
themselves that encourage illegal immigration.154  Hoffman Plastics will do nothing to 
diminish employment opportunities for undocumented workers.  In fact, the opposite is 
true: unscrupulous employers who do not wish to comply with labor laws have an 
incentive to hire undocumented workers.  They can employ undocumented workers, 
violate their rights, and terminate them – or report them to the INS in retaliation155 – if 
they complain or seek to unionize.
Although this is illegal, an undocumented worker has no remedy should it occur.  
Removing the ability to award reinstatement or backpay leaves the NLRB with almost 
nothing in its remedial arsenal where undocumented workers are concerned.  The only 
remaining remedy is the issuance of a cease and desist order.  Under a cease and desist 
order, an employer is ordered not to violate certain statutory provisions.  If the employer 
153
 Lung, supra note 17 at 308.
154
 846 F.2d at 704-05.
155
 The risk of deportation is enhanced by Hoffman Plastics to the extent that the decision 
makes the employee’s immigration status relevant and discoverable.  As a result, 
Hoffman Plastics will simply further marginalize undocumented workers and place them 
outside the scope of legal protections to which they have a statutory right. 
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violates the order, he or she is subject to sanctions and contempt. As such, a cease and 
desist order is forward-looking; it does not address or remedy past violations.
In practice, this will amount to “one free pass.” Employers can violate the labor 
law where undocumented workers are concerned until the Board rules against them and 
issues a cease and desist order.  Upon that ruling, there still will be no meaningful 
sanctions issued.  Instead, the Board will simply instruct the employer not to violate the 
law in the future or face contempt, assuming anyone bothers to report subsequent 
violations to the court.
The one free pass problem is particularly troubling in the context of the garment 
industry, where factories close and re-open under new names with frequency.  
Unscrupulous factory owners could simply close upon the issuance of a cease and desist 
order, terminate all workers, and re-open under a new name in a new facility with no 
cease and desist order hanging over its head.   Theoretically, this cycle could continue 
indefinitely, particularly given the unlikelihood that any employer will be prosecuted for 
labor code violations in the first place.
Furthermore, in nullifying remedies, the Court has undermined any incentive on 
the part of undocumented workers to report NLRA violations in the first place.  A 
credible fear of deportation or termination creates a formidable deterrent for 
undocumented workers under any circumstances.  When undocumented workers learn 
that employers will face no consequences, it is even less likely that they will report 
violations.  The combined effect is that undocumented workers who attempt to unionize 
or report violations face deportation, but their law-violating employers will get off with a 
slap on the wrist.
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2. Attempts to Unionize Will Be Undermined For 
All Workers
Based on the above, Hoffman Plastics provides employers with a mechanism for 
thwarting union organizing with mass firings and relative impunity.  The decision, which 
was purportedly aimed at making undocumented labor less common, will instead result in 
increased exploitation as undocumented labor becomes less expensive to employ.  
The detrimental effects of Hoffman Plastics will not be limited to undocumented 
workers.  Instead, the ruling effectively jeopardizes working conditions for legal 
employees by encouraging the existence of an underground economy, in which 
undocumented workers compete for jobs with documented workers.  Documented 
workers compete at a disadvantage because they are more expensive to employ, given 
that they can unionize and their labor rights must be respected.
Furthermore, the legal distinction between documented and undocumented 
workers will hinder attempts by workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining, 
thereby threatening the rights of all workers.  For unionization and collective bargaining 
to be effective, employees must be able to band together to demand better working 
conditions.  Any action that divides and conquers by creating legal distinctions 
undermines such efforts.
By deterring unionization of undocumented workers, Hoffman Plastics has eroded
unity and damaged workers’ ability to effectively organize.156 Any lack of participation
by undocumented workers in the collective bargaining process will have a negative effect
for all workers.  Employers who do not want a unionized factory are more likely to hire 
156 See, e.g., Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891-92 (undocumented workers must qualify as 
employees under the Act based upon statutory definition of “employee”).
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undocumented workers, who are less likely to unionize.  If undocumented employees do 
attempt to unionize, employers can simply fire them, knowing that they will not be forced 
to pay backpay or any other penalty.157
In the garment industry, attempts to quash unionization by hiring undocumented 
workers are easily foreseeable.  The subcontracting system already enables evasion of 
unionization.  Manufacturers generally contract with small, mobile, nonunion factories
that are difficult for union organizers to locate or monitor.158 Individual employees are 
less likely to organize among themselves without outside union representatives, given 
that they could lose their jobs without repercussions for the employer.
The absence of unionization will likely enable further deterioration of working 
conditions in many factories, particularly in the garment industry, where skirting labor 
codes may be a prerequisite to profitability.  Unions have been effective in ensuring that 
garment factories comply with basic labor codes.159 Without the help of unions, it will be 
more difficult for factory workers to secure minimum wages, overtime, or safe working 
conditions. 160
The absence of unions also will make it more difficult for undocumented workers 
to report and prosecute labor code violations.  There are many benefits to pursuing 
157
 237 F.2d at 647.
158 Lam, supra note 13 at 637-38.
159
 In recent years, wages have declined in all but unionized factories.  For example, 
ACTWU, UNITE, and ILGWU have issued codes of conducts that protect the right of 
free association and require strict compliance with labor laws regulating safety, hours, 
wages,  Factories are monitored periodically to ensure compliance.  See Winefsky and 
Tenney, supra note 52; Ho, Powell, and Volpp, supra note 53 at 637.
160
 Sean A. Andrade, Biting the Hand that Feeds You: How Federal Law has Permitted 
Employers to Violate the Basic Rights of Farmworkers and how this has Begun to Impact 
Other Industries, 4 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 601, 606-09. 
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grievances through the union.  Workers may participate in a grievance-arbitration 
procedure at no cost.  Union assistance helps the employee to overcome an unequal 
balance of power, resources, and experience.161 Union members may be provided with
the assistance of a union representative or lawyer, who will conduct discovery on the 
member’s behalf.  Arbitration is relatively prompt and arbitrators enjoy broad discretion 
in crafting appropriate remedies.162 This avenue is foreclosed to those who effectively 
are unable to form or join unions for fear of termination without recourse.
3. Expansion of Hoffman Plastics Could Further 
Eviscerate Employment Protections
Provisions for backpay are included in the NLRA, the FLSA, and Title VII.   
Even if the courts continue to recognize that undocumented workers are, by definition, 
employees under protective employment statutes, Hoffman Plastics creates precedent for 
denying undocumented workers the remedy of backpay that is traditionally available for 
the violation of these statutes. Efforts to deny undocumented workers remedies for 
various labor code violations have been occurring ever since Sun-Tan.163  Recently, 
161
 Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies For Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines 
And Proposals, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457.
162 Id. at 523-24; 527.  The availability of the union grievance procedure is, by no means, 
a panacea.  The process may be highly politicized, and many arbitrators are perceived to 
hold pro-employer leanings.  The employee loses control of his case, and an employee 
with a less than stellar case may find his case dismissed without hearing, as occurs in 
two-thirds of cases.  Nonetheless, union grievance and arbitration procedures provide 
employees with another option for seeking redress.  Id. at 475-77. 
163
 For example, in Egbuna v. Time Life Libraries, 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998), the 
plaintiff, an undocumented worker, claimed that his former employer had violated Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3, by refusing to rehire him in 
retaliation for his participation in another employee’s discrimination suit. 153 F.3d at 
185.   The court held that the plaintiff could not demonstrate he was a victim of 
discrimination because he did not possess documentation authorizing him to work in the 
United States.  It further held that due to the IRCA, the plaintiff was not entitled to the 
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defendants have once again attempted to expand Hoffman Plastics to areas unrelated to 
the NLRA.164
Moreover, under Hoffman Plastics, a court could affirmatively require any 
employee to prove his immigration status before he is entitled to reinstatement or
backpay. 165 Any employee who does not seek reinstatement and backpay in his or her 
complaint will effectively admit that he or she lacks documentation.  This Catch-22 could 
further deter undocumented workers from pursuing claims against their employers for 
NLRA, FLSA or Title VII violations.
C. How It Can Be Fixed
The sections above have demonstrated that the intersection of labor and 
employment laws have resulted in confusion due to seemingly inconsistent goals.  On the 
one hand, Congress aims to protect the rights of all workers, regardless of immigration 
status.  On the other hand, Congress seeks to deter the employment of undocumented 
workers.  The Supreme Court has attempted to reconcile these conflicting policy goals in 
a way that leaves employment rights without remedies, and allows if not encourages
employers to violate the rights of undocumented workers with impunity.
The section above also explains how in Hoffman Plastics, the Court ignored 
Congressional history to find that although undocumented workers are employees under 
the NLRA, they nonetheless can be allowed no meaningful remedy should employers 
remedy of backpay or reinstatement unless he could prove that he was authorized to work 
in the United States at the time of the employer’s refusal to rehire him.
164
 For example, in De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237 (2002), 
defendants argued that they were entitled to discovery of  documents relating to 
plaintiffs’ immigration status because the plaintiffs had filed claims alleging that 
defendants had violated Title VII and the FLSA.
165
 Summers, supra note 160.  
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violate their rights.  It may appear that a simple solution to this predicament could be 
provided if Congress were to amend the NLRA to explicitly provide its protections to all 
workers, regardless of immigration status.  This would effectively overrule the result in 
Hoffman Plastics. 
Yet, although such an action would benefit employees, it ultimately would be 
insufficient.  A review of Hoffman Plastics ultimately begs the question of whether 
backpay provides a sufficient penalty to any employee, regardless of documentation 
status.  The next section explains that even if undocumented workers were to receive 
backpay, such a remedy still would be insufficient to deter employer wrongdoing, 
particularly when employers have a lot to lose with unionization.  As a result, more 
extensive action by Congress is required in order to ensure that workers are protected 
from labor code violations.
This paper recommends that Congress specifically amend the NLRA to include 
employer penalties sufficient to deter violations of the Act.  It further recommends steps
to ensure that wrongdoers are caught and prosecuted.  Specifically, this paper suggests
that additional resources should be allocated to NLRA enforcement, and that 
undocumented whistleblowers with valid claims should receive amnesty or deferred 
action status.  Alternatively, Congress should preclude from deportation hearings  the 
introduction of evidence gathered through labor law disputes.  Such steps would 
encourage undocumented workers to file complaints regarding employer wrongdoing by 
removing the threat of consequential deportation. 
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1. Congress Must Increase NLRA Penalties
The NLRA authorizes remedial orders but does not authorize the Board to 
“punish” wrongdoers.  This limitation leaves the Board with little enforcement authority, 
regardless of whether the employee is authorized to work in the United States.  The 
situation is, of course, much worse when an undocumented worker’s rights have been 
violated, given that he or she cannot receive backpay or reinstatement.  
Yet, even an award of backpay does not sufficiently deter misconduct.  An award 
of backpay restores “the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have 
obtained, but for the illegal discrimination.”166  The goal of backpay is to make the 
employee whole, not to punish the employer.167 Employees are required to seek other 
work while they pursue their claim, and any amount earned after illegal termination is 
off-set against the amount an employer is obliged to pay.   This mitigation requirement, 
when combined with the unlikelihood of being caught and prosecuted, further 
undermines any deterrence.168
Similarly, reinstatement is not an effective deterrent.  Employees are required to 
mitigate by seeking other employment; those who have successfully secured alternate 
employment often are not interested in the remedy.  Even those without alternate 
employment may hesitate to return to a hostile employer that illegally fired them for fear 
of further retaliation.169 In fact, NLRB statistics reveal that of 16,000 employees, less 
than a quarter are reinstated. 170
166 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
167
 H.R. Rep. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1977).
168 Id. at 1790.
169 Id. at 1791-92.
170 Summers, supra note 160 at 478. 
Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops
42
Finally, cease and desist orders simply tell the employer not to violate the law; 
they do nothing to penalize the employer, even for egregious misconduct.  Nor do they 
deter misconduct due to the one free pass problem.
In short, there is every reason for shops seeking to avoid unionization to risk 
NLRA penalties in order to disrupt a campaign’s momentum.  By the time employees 
terminated for favoring unionization are reinstated, organizing momentum is lost, and 
unionization often has been defeated.171  Current remedies do nothing to dissuade 
employers from terminating employees seeking to unionize, and paying the paltry 
penalties under the Act – assuming they are ever prosecuted. Thus, while it is necessary 
for undocumented workers to receive the same remedies as documented workers, current 
remedies provided are simply insufficient to serve their intended purposes. 
Although the purported goal of NLRA remedies is not the punishment of 
employers, it is unclear why employers should not be penalized for illegal acts.  The 
current remedies under the NLRA do not sufficiently focus on the wrongdoing of the 
employer.  Any remedy should contain a level of penalty sufficient to deter employer 
wrongdoing, even when the likelihood of prosecution is factored into the calculus.  
Deterring wrongdoing in the first place will also prevent unscrupulous employers from 
gaining an unfair advantage over law-abiding competitors .  
Some unions have recognized the insufficiency of current remedies and have 
proposed alternatives, particularly where undocumented workers are concerned.  For 
example, because a nominal backpay award has not sufficiently deterred unlawful 
conduct, the ILGWU has proposed that damages be calculated based upon actual rather 
171 Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under 
the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1788-89 (June, 1983).
Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops
43
than legal availability.  The ILGWU would shift the burden of immigration status to the 
employer as an affirmative defense.  If the employer raises immigration status, the 
ILGWU recommends that the NLRB provide alternate remedies, such as backpay up to 
the time when the employer establishes that the employee would have been terminated 
for nondiscriminatory reasons.172
This proposal is interesting, yet ultimately, it does not go far enough to deter 
misconduct.  It still relies upon backpay to provide the gauge of damages, which is 
insufficient even when the worker can collect it.  The proposal still allows the workers’ 
immigration statuses to remain relevant and subject to discovery.  Furthermore, it is not 
realistic to assess backpay based upon the likelihood of a legitimate termination; in 
theory, a worker could collect backpay for the rest of his or her working life.  
A better approach would create meaningful remedies where the workers’ status is 
simply irrelevant.   If Congress were to create additional, effective remedies sufficient to 
punish employers found guilty of wrongdoing, the perceived IRCA problem presented by 
reliance upon backpay – and the resulting inquiry into immigration status – could be 
avoided.  Employees harmed by an employer’s illegal, tortuous conduct would be entitled 
to damages, regardless of immigration status.
In general, the theory underlying a claim provides guidance for what type of 
remedy is available.173  If a claim is based upon a contract theory, a successful plaintiff 
generally is entitled to compensatory and consequential damages.  A plaintiff whose 
claim sounds in tort law, however, often is entitled to significantly greater damages, 
including punitive damages in certain cases.  Wrongful termination claims generally 
172
 Nessel, supra note 61 at 369
173 Summers, supra note 160 at 462.
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sound in tort law.  Notably, undocumented aliens are permitted to recover tort damages 
for wrongful termination. 174
This paper suggests that the NLRB should be authorized to award statutory 
damages similar to those allowed for violations of the FLSA.  The FLSA authorizes 
statutory damages of up to $10,000 per violation.175   It also allows a successful claimant 
to recovery liquidated damages, as well as attorney fees and costs. There is no reason 
why a claimant under the NLRA should not be eligible for similar damages.
This paper further recommends that the NLRA be amended to allow the award of 
punitive damages.  Given that undocumented aliens are entitled to sue for tort 
damages,176 there is no policy reason why tort remedies couldn’t be effectively 
incorporated into labor codes such as the NLRA. Such penalties would be more likely 
sufficient to deter wrongdoing. Punitive damages would be particularly appropriate in 
cases where the employer conduct is egregious, or where the employer is a chronic 
violator.  In the context of the garment industry, punitive damages could drive domestic 
sweatshops out of business.  This could reduce the number of unscrupulous 
subcontractors willing to perpetuate sweatshop conditions.  Reputable businesses would 
no longer be forced to compete at a disadvantage.  Manufacturers would be forced to 
absorb the cost of legally compliant production.
Such a proposal assumes that the codes will actually be enforced.  As it stands, 
however, the likelihood that a sweatshop will be caught and prosecuted for labor code 
174
 Bosniak, supra note 6.
175 29 U.S.C. 216.
176 Bosniak, supra note 6.
Jennifer S. Berman – Eliminating Sweatshops
45
violations is relatively small. 177 The next section explores some measures that could 
better ensure that wrongdoers will be caught and prosecuted, thereby resulting in 
effective deterrence. 
2. Effective Deterrence Requires a Greater Likelihood 
of Prosecution
There are at least two ways to ensure that wrongdoers are more likely brought to 
justice.  One way would be to increase government enforcement.  Currently, sweatshop 
operators know that there is very little chance that they will be caught or prosecuted.  The 
DOL is dramatically understaffed.  Due to the dearth of investigators, there is only a 
twenty percent chance that the DOL will catch a violator.178 Once the violator is caught, 
the DOL rarely follows up to ensure that sweatshops comply with labor laws.  This 
failure results in repeat violations for at least one out of three violators. An obvious step 
would be to increase resources to the DOL so that they can investigate and prosecute 
sweatshops.  Yet, due to politics and government budget cuts, this is unlikely to occur.179
A better approach would be to encourage workers to file private complaints 
against sweatshop employers.  Currently, although employees may sue their employers 
directly, they rarely do so.  Many employees do not know their rights.  This is a 
circumstance that education through unionization could improve.  Yet, even employees 
who know their rights may hesitate to file claims because they are afraid of losing their 
jobs without recourse. Ensuring that labor codes provide remedies for all employees 
would help solve this problem.  
177 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 160 at 463-64.
178 Id. at 495.
179 Id.
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Of course, undocumented workers risk deportation as well as termination in filing 
lawsuits.180 Although in theory, employers are forbidden from reporting employees to 
the INS in retaliation for exercising collective bargaining rights, this paper has already 
described how the absence of effective remedies makes such protection meaningless, 
particularly if the INS is able to act on unlawful tips.181 There is little to stop the INS 
from introducing evidence in deportation proceedings obtained due to the employer’s 
breach of the NLRA.182
Undocumented workers therefore need better protection.  One approach could be 
to protect discovery of immigration status, to the extent it remains relevant, with a court 
order.  Another option would be to provide amnesty or deferred action status to 
whistleblowers. The INS could exercise its discretion to provide temporary work 
authorization to undocumented workers who have filed credible claims of workplace 
violations.183 Such steps would help law enforcement officials pursue actions against 
sweatshops, since prosecutors would depend upon the testimony of the workers.184
Alternatively, as suggested by Professor Lori Nessel, Congress could adopt a rule 
for deportation proceedings suppressing the use of evidence obtained through the 
violation of the NLRA. This would be similar to the “fruit of the poison tree” exclusion 
180
 This fear would be particularly legitimate if their immigration status is relevant in 
employment claims.  As described above, a shift to a tort-based remedy would make the 
employee’s immigration status irrelevant. 
181 Nessel, supra note 61 at 379.
182 See, e.g., Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381 (2d. Cir., 1997) (INA allows deportation of 
aliens based upon information provided to INS by employer trying to quash union 
activities).
183 Nessel, supra note 61 at 386-87.
184 Id.
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relied on in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.185  The INS would be prohibited from 
relying on information provided in violation of the NLRA or other labor codes.186
3. Increase manufacturer liability
The above steps will increase the odds that employers who violate labor laws will 
face appropriate consequences.  Yet further reforms are needed to ensure that all who are 
responsible for sweatshop conditions are held liable.
Manufacturers benefit from sweatshop labor, and as described above, they dictate 
the prices that garment workers are paid for their labor.  Manufacturers must be brought 
within the fold of liability by recognizing that they truly are joint employers of the 
workers who toil for them and create garments for their benefit and profit.  They can no 
longer be permitted to hide behind the fiction of a contractor relationship, thereby 
relieving themselves of responsibility for the violations that they create.187
V. CONCLUSION
As described above, the current law, as dictated by Hoffman Plastics, allows 
employers to violate the NLRA with impunity when the rights of undocumented workers 
are involved.  In an effort to deter illegal immigration, the Supreme Court has deprived 
the NLRB of remedies necessary to effectuate Congressional goals.  At the same time, 
the Court’s ruling will encourage unscrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers, 
thereby undermining the policies that the Court intends to support.
185
 Although the Court has ruled that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to civil 
deportation proceedings, Congress could still pass an evidentiary rule barring use of 
improperly obtained evidence.
186 Nessel, supra note 61 at 377-78.  
187
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A better approach would make NLRA remedies independent from a worker’s 
immigration status.  This would ensure that both undocumented and documented workers 
have a reason to report labor law violations.  These remedies must be sufficient to punish 
unscrupulous employers and deter future wrongdoing.  As it stands, limitation of 
remedies to backpay and possible reinstatement are insufficient.  It is necessary to create 
additional statutory remedies to punish wrongdoers.
At the same time, remedies are meaningless unless employers are actually 
prosecuted for wrongdoing.  Steps must be taken to ensure that workers report violations 
and sweatshop operators are actually prosecuted.  Providing amnesty or deferred action 
status to undocumented immigrants who report violations will provide necessary measure 
of protection so that whistleblowers are not deported in exchange for ensuring that our 
labor codes are respected.  In addition, the DOL must be sufficiently staffed to create a 
likelihood of prosecution. Finally, it is necessary to hold manufacturers responsible as 
joint employers so that they no longer create situations that require dependence on 
sweatshop labor.  
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